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Congressional decision making and the separation of powers

By: MARTIN, Andrew D.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: 2001American Political Science Review 95, 2, p. 361-378Abstract: To what extent does the separation of powers affect congerssional roll call voting behavior? To answer this question, I offer a strategic model of congressinal decision making that asserts members of Congress pursue public policy goals when casting roll call votes. From the equilibrium prediction of a formal model, I generate testable hypotheses by computing the expected net amount of shophisticated (nonsincere) congressional behavior given changes in decision context. I text the predictions of the theoretical model with data from all civil rights roll call votes from the 83d to the 102d Congress. The results demonstrate that both the other legislative chamber and the Supreme Court profoundly constrain House members and senators when casting roll call votes. This is strong evidence of the importance of policy outcomes to members of Congress when voting on the floor
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Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
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To what extent does the separation of powers affect congerssional roll call voting behavior? To answer this question, I offer a strategic model of congressinal decision making that asserts members of Congress pursue public policy goals when casting roll call votes. From the equilibrium prediction of a formal model, I generate testable hypotheses by computing the expected net amount of shophisticated (nonsincere) congressional behavior given changes in decision context. I text the predictions of the theoretical model with data from all civil rights roll call votes from the 83d to the 102d Congress. The results demonstrate that both the other legislative chamber and the Supreme Court profoundly constrain House members and senators when casting roll call votes. This is strong evidence of the importance of policy outcomes to members of Congress when voting on the floor

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