<style type="text/css"> .wpb_animate_when_almost_visible { opacity: 1; }</style> Enap catalog › Details for: Plausibility of signals by a heterogeneous committee
Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Plausibility of signals by a heterogeneous committee

By: REHBIEL, Keith.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: 2001American Political Science Review 95 , 2, p. 453-458Abstract: Krishna and Morgan propose "amendments" to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel`s theoretial studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the emprirical expetations o prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to theterogeneous committeess and compares and contrast the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signalig games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules - specifically, the finding of a poisitve relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules - is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Item type Current location Collection Call number Status Date due Barcode
Periódico Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
Periódico Not for loan

Krishna and Morgan propose "amendments" to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel`s theoretial studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the emprirical expetations o prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to theterogeneous committeess and compares and contrast the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signalig games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules - specifically, the finding of a poisitve relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules - is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Click on an image to view it in the image viewer

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
<
Acesso à Informação TRANSPARÊNCIA

Powered by Koha