Plausibility of signals by a heterogeneous committee
By: REHBIEL, Keith
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Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Krishna and Morgan propose "amendments" to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel`s theoretial studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the emprirical expetations o prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. This note gives primary attention to theterogeneous committeess and compares and contrast the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctly less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in previous legislative signalig games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules - specifically, the finding of a poisitve relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules - is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former is informationally efficient and the latter are not
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