The supply and demand of governance in standard-setting : insights from the past
By: SPRUYT, Hendrik
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2001Subject(s): Coinage | Coordination Game | Prisioner`s Dilemma | Standards, Weight and MeasuresJournal of European Public Policy 8, 3, p. 371-391Abstract: Governance in standard-setting can be distinguished in the degree of public or private oversith, and i the degree to which the environment is hierarchical or narchical. This variation in governance structures can be explained ty three vairables; (1) the gains that flow to politial entrepreneurs in supplying state intervention; (2) the strategic setting in which private and public actors operate;and (3) the intrinsic attributes of the good in questions. The article argues tahta while private demand is an important facet of standards governance, greater attention needs to be paid to the incentives for political entrepreneurs to supply public intervention, and the incentives for political entrepreneurs to agree on commom standards. A historical analysis of product standards and transactional standards, as wights and measures, reveals that public actors may impede satandardization even in the face of high private demand and clear public welfare gains
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Governance in standard-setting can be distinguished in the degree of public or private oversith, and i the degree to which the environment is hierarchical or narchical. This variation in governance structures can be explained ty three vairables; (1) the gains that flow to politial entrepreneurs in supplying state intervention; (2) the strategic setting in which private and public actors operate;and (3) the intrinsic attributes of the good in questions. The article argues tahta while private demand is an important facet of standards governance, greater attention needs to be paid to the incentives for political entrepreneurs to supply public intervention, and the incentives for political entrepreneurs to agree on commom standards. A historical analysis of product standards and transactional standards, as wights and measures, reveals that public actors may impede satandardization even in the face of high private demand and clear public welfare gains
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