Executive configuration and fiscal performance in post-communist central and eastern Europe
By: BRUSIS, Martin
.
Contributor(s): DIMITROV, Vesselin.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: December 2001Subject(s): Orçamento | Core Executive | Finance Ministry | Fiscal Policy | Institutions | Central and Eastern EuropeJournal of European Public Policy 8, 6, p. 888-910Abstract: This article examines the relationships between the configuration of core executive institutions, whith a particular focus on the position of the prime minister and finance minister, and fiscal performance, defined in terms of the maintenacne of aggregate fiscal discipline and the predictability of the budgetary process. The study covers post-communist Hungary, Poland, ehte Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The first wave of institutional reform in these countries followed the transition to democracy and was essentially negative in its impact. It eliminated communist-era institutions that competed with the prime minister and the minister of finance, but left the two in a relatively weak position vis-a-vis their cabinet colleagues. this led to poor performance and serious fiscal crises in the mid-1990s. The second wave of institutional reform arose in response to the fiscal crises and created a more centralized configuration of executive institutions, producing significantly better fiscal performance
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
This article examines the relationships between the configuration of core executive institutions, whith a particular focus on the position of the prime minister and finance minister, and fiscal performance, defined in terms of the maintenacne of aggregate fiscal discipline and the predictability of the budgetary process. The study covers post-communist Hungary, Poland, ehte Czech Republic and Bulgaria. The first wave of institutional reform in these countries followed the transition to democracy and was essentially negative in its impact. It eliminated communist-era institutions that competed with the prime minister and the minister of finance, but left the two in a relatively weak position vis-a-vis their cabinet colleagues. this led to poor performance and serious fiscal crises in the mid-1990s. The second wave of institutional reform arose in response to the fiscal crises and created a more centralized configuration of executive institutions, producing significantly better fiscal performance
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