The demand-side politics of EU enlargement : democracy and the application for EU membership
By: MATTLI, Walter.
Contributor(s): PLUMPER, Thomas.
Material type: ArticlePublisher: August 2002Subject(s): Central and Eastern European Countries | Enlargement | European Union | Lobbying | Public Choice | Reforms | TransitionJournal of European Public Policy 9, 4, p. 550-574Abstract: Most theoretical arguments about enlargement have sougth to enlucidate why the EU may have an interest in accepting CEECs. While these `supply-side' arguments are essential building blocks of a comprehensive account of enlargement, they need to be complemented by a theory that seeks to understand the politics and economics of enlargement from a demand-side perspective. We show in a formal model how a transition country's demand for EU membership relates to both regime type and its willingness to implement economic reforms. Specifically, we argue that leaders in more democratic regimes had a greater incentive to push ahead with costly `institution-building reforms' which, in effect, aligned their countries with EU rules and institutions. The impetus for continuing pro-integration regulatory reforms came from the greater electoral accountability of these leaders. We test this claim with a Cox continuous time survival model with time-dependent covariates. The results confirms the dominant impact of increasing political participation on the likelihood of and EU applicationItem type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Most theoretical arguments about enlargement have sougth to enlucidate why the EU may have an interest in accepting CEECs. While these `supply-side' arguments are essential building blocks of a comprehensive account of enlargement, they need to be complemented by a theory that seeks to understand the politics and economics of enlargement from a demand-side perspective. We show in a formal model how a transition country's demand for EU membership relates to both regime type and its willingness to implement economic reforms. Specifically, we argue that leaders in more democratic regimes had a greater incentive to push ahead with costly `institution-building reforms' which, in effect, aligned their countries with EU rules and institutions. The impetus for continuing pro-integration regulatory reforms came from the greater electoral accountability of these leaders. We test this claim with a Cox continuous time survival model with time-dependent covariates. The results confirms the dominant impact of increasing political participation on the likelihood of and EU application
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