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Pay comparability across and within uk boards : an empirical analysis of the cash pay awards to CEOs and other board members

By: EZZAMEL, Mahmoud.
Contributor(s): WATSON, Robert.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: 2002Journal of Management Studies 39, 2, p. 207-232Abstract: Drawing on the literature on social comparison and equity theories, this paper analyses the determinants of, and the relationships between, the cash pay awards of CEOs and other board members for a sample of large UK companies over the period 1992-95. Our results suggest that external labour market and internal (i.e., within board) pay comparisons are important in explaining both CEO and other directors' pay awards. In the case of CEOs, however, there is evidence of an asymetric adjustiment to prior period pay anomalies, whereby the pay of the relatively underpaid executives displays significantly greater sensitivity to external market comparison pay levels. This asymmetric adjustment process results in a `bidding-up' of average CEO pay relative to other board members over the four year period investigated
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Drawing on the literature on social comparison and equity theories, this paper analyses the determinants of, and the relationships between, the cash pay awards of CEOs and other board members for a sample of large UK companies over the period 1992-95. Our results suggest that external labour market and internal (i.e., within board) pay comparisons are important in explaining both CEO and other directors' pay awards. In the case of CEOs, however, there is evidence of an asymetric adjustiment to prior period pay anomalies, whereby the pay of the relatively underpaid executives displays significantly greater sensitivity to external market comparison pay levels. This asymmetric adjustment process results in a `bidding-up' of average CEO pay relative to other board members over the four year period investigated

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