inclui índice

1. Individual preference and individual choice -- 1.1. Some fundamental notation and definitions -- 1.2. Preferences -- 1.3. Multiattribute outcomes -- 1.4. Decision making under certainty -- 1.5. Decision making under risk -- 1.6. The meaning of cardinal utility -- 1.7. Cardinal utility and subjective probability -- 1.8.Summary 2. Individual preference and social choice -- 2.1. Arrow's impossibility result -- 2.2. Paradoxes of voting -- 2.3. The power of agendas -- 2.4. Misrepresentation of preferences -- 2.5.Vote trading -- 2.6. Summary 3. Basic theory of noncooperative games -- 3.1. Noncooperative games: an example -- 3.2. Games in extensive form: the game tree -- 3.3. Strategy and the normal form -- 3.4. Normal from of infinite games --3.5. Best-response strategies and domination -- 3.6. Pure-strategy equilibria -- 3.7. Some conditions for existence of pure-strategy equilibria -- 3.8. Mixed strategies -- 3.9. Perfect equilibria -- 3.10. Summary 4. Elections nad two-person zero-sum games -- 4.1. Zero-sum games -- 4.2. Interchangeability and equivalence -- 4.3. Maxmin and minmax -- 4.4. Concave games and resource allocations in elections -- 4.5. Symmetric games and candidate objectives -- 4.6. Two-candidate elections with a single issue -- 4.7. Two-candidate multidimensional elections -- 4.8. Disequilibrium with income redistribution policies -- 4.9. Mixed strategies and the uncovered set in elections -- 4.10. Rational expectations and voter ignorance -- 4.11. n-person zero-sum games -- 4.12. summary 5. Nonzero-sum games: political economy, public goods, and the prisoners' dilemma -- 5.1. Nonzero- sum games -- 5.2. The two-person prisoners' dilemma -- 5.3. Public goods and externalities -- 5.4. An analogous game with a continuum of strategies -- 5.5. Orher prisoners' dilemma -- 5.6. Demand-revealing mechanisms -- 5.7. summary 6. Institutions, strategic voting, and agendas -- 6.1. Sincere voting, issue by issue -- 6.2. Sophisticated voting, issue by issue -- 6.3. The disappearance of stability without separability -- 6.4. Sophisticated voting and agendas -- 6.5. Some experimental and empirical evidence -- 6.6. Incomplete information and sophisticated voting -- 6.7.summary 7. Cooperative games and the characteristic function -- 7.1. Strong equilibria -- 7.2. The characteristic function, v(C) -- 7.3. Simple game -- 7.4. The special case of transferable utility -- 7.5. Some examples of charactetistic-function games -- 7.6. Alternative forms of v(C) -- 7.7. Ambiguities in v(C) -- 7.8. Summary 8. The core -- 8.1. The core -- 8.2. The core and pareto-optimality -- 8.3. Transferable utility games -- 8.4. Balanced games -- 8.5. Committees with a single issue -- 8.6. An extended example: the genossenschaften -- 8.7. Multiple dimensions ans some experimental evidence -- 8.8 Logrolling and some experimental ambiguities -- 8.9 Extraordinary majorities -- 8.10. The core and ambiguities with v(C) -- 8.11. Summary 9. Solution theory -- 9.1. The stable set -- 9.2. Some properties of V-sets -- 9.3. Bargaining sets for simple voting games -- 9.4. Cooperative vs. noncooperative analysis of committees -- 9.5. Extensions of the bargaining set -- 9.6. The size principle -- 9.7. Problems with nontransferable utility games -- 9.8. The competitive solution -- 9.9. Some experimental evidence -- 9.10. A noncooperative view and alternative ideias -- 9.11. summary 10. Repeated games and information: some research frontiers -- 10.1. The repeated prisoners' dilemma -- 10.2. The balance of power -- 10.3. A finitely repeated game: the chain store paradox -- 10.4. The shapley value and the power index -- 10.5. The nash bargaining model -- 10.6. Relating the shapley value to nash's scheme -- 10.7. Reciprocity and repeated games -- 10.8. summary