GUARNASCHELLI, Serena <br/><br/>
An experimental sutyd of jury decison rules 

 -  2000 
<br/><br/> We present experimental results on groups facing a dicision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatement variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and pre-vot deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting  under unanimity rule: a large farction of our subjects vote for decision analogous to conviction even  when  their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence. This is roughly  consistent with the  game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Although individual behavior is explained well by  ghe game theoretic model, there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision. Contraty to Feddersen  and Pesendorfer, nour experiments there  are fewer outcomes  analogous to incorrect convictions under  unanimity rule than under majority rule. In the case of no deliberation, we simultaneously accont for the individual and group data using quantial response equilibrium