McCarty, Nolan <br/><br/>
Presidential pork :  executive veto power and distributive politics 

 -  2000 
<br/><br/> It is often argue that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending  by the legislature. I argue that the effect  of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium , stronger veto power  leads to a lower level of distributive spending, but the effects are mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others. The model also generates new insights and predictions about  fiscal policy under the separation of powers, including the effects of divided government, electoral rules, and term limitations for the executive