Political economy: institutions, competition, and representation :  proceedings of the seventh international symposium in economic theory and econometrics 

 - Cambridge :  Cambridge University,  1993 
 - 522 p. 
 - International symposia in economic theory and econometrics .
<br/><br/> Inclui bibliografia 
<br/><br/> Political economy: a personal interpretation and an overview - Norman J. Schofield  1. Perspectives on political economy    - Political ideology, communication, and community - Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger    - Implementation and enforcement in institutional modeling - Leonid Hurwicz    - Toward a theory of institutional change - Douglass C. North    - The development of contemporary political theory - Peter C. Ordeshook  2. Representation and voting    - Proportional representation, approval voting, and coalitionally straightforward elections - Roger B. Myerson    - Party competition in a spatial model of coalition formation - Norman J. Schofield    - Some foundations for empirical study in the Euclidean spatial model of social choice - Craig A. Tovey  3. Political Institutions    - Communication in institutions: efficiency in a repeated prisoner's dilemma with hidden information - Randall L. Calvert    - The courts and slavery in the United States: Property rights and credible commitment -John N. Drobak    - On the pervasiveness of sophisticated sincerity - Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel    - Initial versus continuing proposal power in legislative seniority systems - Richard D. McKelvey and Raymond Riezman  4. Political Competition    - Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated elections model - Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarajan K. Sundaram    - Campaign contributions and party-candidate competition in services and policies - David P. Baron and Jongryn Mo    - Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote - John Londregan and Thomas Romer    - Credibility and the responsiveness of direct legislation - Arthur Lupia  5. Information acquisition by government    - Information acquisition and orthogonal argument - David Austen-Smith    - A welfare analysis of political action - Susanne Lohmann  6. Government behavior    - Monetary policy and credibility under exact monetary aggregation - William A. Barnett    - A general equilibrium model with endogenous government behavior - Eric Drissen and Frans van Winden     
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>0521428319 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Teoria Econômica<br/>Teoria Política<br/>Ideologia Política<br/>Eleição<br/>Política Monetária
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Geographic Terms: </label><br/>Estados Unidos