SAINT-MARTIN, Denis

Managerialist advocate or "control freak"? : the Janus-faced office of the auditor general - Toronto : IPAC, Summer 2004

This article highlights the contradictions in the role of the Office of Auditor General (OAG) and identifies the sources as well as the consequences of the office’s Janus-like character as both a managerialist advocate and “control freak.” This character, it is argued, is shaped by institutional factors and the knowledge-basis on which the office relies to fulfil its mission. Three causes of “institutional schizophrenia” are identified: the OAG’s mandate in relation to financial and value-for-money audit (VFMA); the combination of the OAG’s institutional permeability and the structure of the management consulting market; and the tensions between the “negative” and “positive” dimensions of the office’s mandate. On the consequences side, the author discusses three elements: the limited capacity of the OAG to develop a coherent position about managerialism; the fact that the advocacy of managerialist principles is drawing the OAG closer into the political realm; and the fragility of professionalism as a mechanism for regulating the management consultant’s role of the OAG in relation to VFMA