OSTROM, Elinor  <br/><br/>
A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action :  presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997 

 - New York, NY :  Cambridge University Press,  March 1998 
<br/><br/> The remainder of this article is divided into six sections. In the first I briefly review the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory. related to social dilemmas. The next will summarize the challenge to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. Then I examine two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are "better than rational" (Cosmides and Tooby 1994) by building conditions in which reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The following section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, and the next develops an initial theoretical scenario. I conclude by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.