Uncertainty, shifting power, and appeasement
- New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, December 1996
Great Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930´s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in wich a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state´s demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state´s demands are unlimited, the the declining state prefers figthing. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be war. This situation creates a trad-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease te rising state by making a series of concessions