HANEKE, Uwe <br/><br/>
A inflação brasileira e a teoria de jogos 

 - São Paulo :  Nobel,  out./dez. 1995 
<br/><br/> Based on the disaggregation of the private sector as an amplification of the well-known Barro & Gordon policy-game model, a coordination and/or cooperation problem of the price-setters in the private sector is identified as a possible cause for the persistence of inflation even during stabilization efforts. This kind of persistence is, at least in the short-term, independent from the willingness of the government to stop inflation. A process of self-fulfilling prophecies is started by the “wait-and-see” behavior of private sector’s price-setters, which can result in the giving up of the stabilization policy. Breaking this “wait-and-see” behavior could be one of the major problems in stabilizing economies with chronic high inflation