Democratic constitutional design and public policy :  analysis and evidence 

 - Cambridge :  The Mit,  2006 
 - 373 p. 
<br/><br/> 1. Introduction: Rational choice politics and institutions - Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg  I. Voting systems, agency, and public policy  2. Direct democracy: designing a living constitution - Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer  3. Constitutions and economic policy - Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini  4. Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system - Thomas Stratmann  II. Legislative decisions and structure and policy outcomes  5. The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies - Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo  6. On the merits of bicameral legislatures: Intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability - Roger D. Congleton  7. Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy - John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain  III. Decentralization and Federalism  8. Federalism: A constitutional perspective - Dennis C. Mueller  9. Common tax pool problems in federal systems - Brian Knight  IV. Legal institutions, regulation, and economic growth  10. Judicial independence and economic development - Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt  11. Constitutions and prosperity: The impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations - Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney  V. Constitutional design, durability, and stability  12. Amendment procedures and constitutional stability - Bjorn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton  13. Designing constitutional stability - Barry R. Weingast 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>0262532808 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/> Ciência Política<br/>Política Pública<br/>Justiça Eleitoral<br/>Democracia<br/>Forma de Estado