MCGOWAN, Lee <br/><br/>
Discretion and politicization in EU competition policy :  the case of merger control 

 - Malden :  Wiley-Blackwell,  April 1999 
<br/><br/> In a world where goods and services (but also people, capital and ideas) are increasingly ignoring national borders, competition policy has emerged as a highly salient issue at the heart of international trade discussions. Aspects of competition policy, from cartels and monopolies to state aids and the liberalization of the utilities, have become a regular feature in the pages of the financial and legal press and have become identified as a central element in any government's policy towards industry and its drive for competitiveness. This article focuses on European Union merger control and although appreciative of the dominance of economics and law in competition policy, stresses the political dimension to competition policy. A government and public administration perspective is essential. This is in evidence in the type of regime, the commitment to enforcing the law, the role of discretion and issues such as transparency and democracy. The example of merger control is used to illustrate how the European Commission (EC) has emerged and operates as a genuinely federal actor in determining and shaping merger policy throughout the EU. In short, this article accounts for policy development, the decision making process and in particular the degree to which discretion and politicization underpin one of the most crucial aspects of economic regulation.