COTHRAN, Dan A. <br/><br/>
Mexican presidents and budgetary secrecy 

 - New York :  Marcel Dekker,  1988 
<br/><br/> A government budget in most industrial countries is a reasonably accurate statement of that government's fiscal intentions for the coming year. In less industrialized countries, however, the budget is often not a very accurate indicator of what the government will do. From the 1930s until the 1980s, the Mexican national government budgeted like a non-industrial country in certain ways. In particular, projected spending and actual spending bore little resemblance to each other. From 1933 until at least 1982, the Mexican government always spent more than it indicated in its formal budget, sometimes as much as 50 to 100 percent more. Moreover, the “excess” was spent in semi-secrecy with full public disclosure usually not occurring until years later. This paper examines the aggregate pattern of this budgetary gap and its strategic use by Mexican presidents