Dubnick, Melvin J. <br/><br/>
Accountable agents :  federal performance measurement and third-party government 

 - Cary :  Oxford University,  jan. 2010 
<br/><br/> Ordinarily research articles on public sector third-party governance, or the state of agents, turn to the subject of accountability in their conclusions. Rather that leaving it to the a problem of accountability. To consider accountablity, we studied contemporary performance measurement practices in the federal government, particularly as they are presented using a six-part "promises of accountability" heuristic which captured the many and varied uses characteristics of third parties and the nature of their principal-agent relations are a key determinant of accountability; bureaucratic and hierarchical controls enhance agency and program accountability; building rules and program policies into grants and contracts enhance accountability; agencies that practice lateral trust-based forms of "relational contracting" foster cultures of accountability; auditing and reporting requirements enhance program accountability; federal performance measurement regimes tend to be executive branch forms of accountability; federal performance measurement regimes are primarily attempts to superimpose managerial logic and managerial process on inherently political processes embedded in the separation of powers; there is little evidence that performance-based accountability results in enhancing democratic outcomes or greater justice or equity 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Governança<br/>Terceiro Setor<br/>Prestação de Contas<br/>Avaliação de Desempenho