NIXON, David C <br/><br/>
Appointment delay for vacancies on the Federal Communications Commision 

 - Malden, MA :  Blackwell Publishers,  jul./aug. 2001 
<br/><br/> Confirmation politics for judicial appointees is an exhaustively studied phenomenon, but the politics of appointment for independent agencies is less well understood, because nominees are very rarely rejected and the Senate fails even to hold a recorded vote for most appointees. However, alternative evidence of conflict between the president and the senate is available: the lenght of time it takes to fill a vacancy on a board or comission. An empirical assessment of FCC vacancies, based on ana exponential regression model of vacancy duration, demonstrate that statutory restrictions on the partisanship of the board significantily deteriorate the efficiency of the appointment process. In additon, the appointment of minorities (though not of women) occurs only after unusually drawn-out appointments. A straightforward test of whether divided government leads to extended vacancies turns up negative