DUCH, Raymond M <br/><br/>
A development model of heterogeneous economic voting in new democracies 

 -  2001 
<br/><br/> I argue that information and trust in nascent democratic institutions are two important sources of heterogeneity in economic voting in transition democracies. Economic voting develops in postcommunist electorates as ambiguity regarding the link between government policy and economic outcomes declines. The link becomes less amibiguous as citizens become more informed about how democratic  institutions function and gain increasing confidence or trust in the responsiveness of these institution to public preferences. In the early period of democratization the conditions necessary for an effective agency relationship between voter and incumbent are not yet fully developed. Economic voting increases as these levels of information on, and trust in, government rise. The analysis that tests these propositions is based on a public opinion survey conducted in Hungary in 1997. The test is replicated with a 1997 Polish election