DELMAS, Magali <br/><br/>
Government credible commitment to the French and American Nuclear Power Industries 

 -  2001 
<br/><br/> Backlash against nuclear power, although widespread, affected nuclear power programs differently in the United States than in France owing to their differing institutional setups. This article uses a transaction costs economics approach to examine government credible commitment to the French and American nuclear power industries. Positive political theory sends light on the comparative institutional environment in each industry. The American combination of gramented power, little reliance on bureaucratic expertise, an independent judiciary, and opposing interest groups greatly undermines the ability of the U.S. government to credibly commit to  the nuclear power industry. In France, despite substantial anti-nuclear interest groups, the impermeability of the institutuional setup - no division of power, weak judiciary, and reliance on bureaucratic expertise - effectively prevents activists from influencing policy outcomes