LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation - Cambridge : The MIT , 1993 - 705 p.

I - Price and Rate-of-return Regulation 1. Cost-Reimbursement Rules 2. Pricing by a Single-Product Firm with and without Budget Balance 3. Pricing and Incentives in a Multiproduct Firm 4. Regulation of Quality II - Product Market Competition 5. Competitive Ramsey Formulas and Access Pricing 6. Bypass and Cream Skimming III - Bidding for Natural Contracts 7. Auctioning Incentive Contracts 8. Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity IV - The Dynamics of Regulation 9. Dynamics without Commitent and The Ratchet Effect 10. Commitment and Renegotiation V - The Politics of Regulation 11. Regulatory Capture 12. Cost Padding, Auditing, and Collusion 13. Cartelization by Regulation 14. Auction Design and Favoritism VI - Regulatory Institutions 15. Regulatory Instruments, Hearings, and Interest Group Monitoring 16. Commitment and Political Accountability 17. Privatization and Incentives

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