TREISMAN, Daniel <br/><br/>
The architecture of government :  rethinking political decentralization  

 - New York :  Cambridge University ,  2007 
 - 332 p. 
 - Cambridge studies in comparative politics .
<br/><br/> 1. Introduction   1.1 A quick look back  1.2 The arguments  1.3 A note on methods: Formal modeling  1.4 Overview  2. The political process  2.1 Defining decentralization  2.2 Modeling politics  3. Administrative efficiency  3.1 Optimal scale  3.2 Heterogeneous tastes and policy differentiation  3.3 Costs of organization  3.4 Conclusion  4. Competition among governments  4.1 Competing for mobile residents  4.2 Competing for mobile capital  5. Fiscal policy and redistribution  5.1 The "common pool"  5.2 The "soft budget constraint"  5.3 Decentralizing redistribution  6. Fiscal coordination and incentives  6.1 Vertical "overgrazing"  6.2 Fiscal decentralization and incentives  7. Citizens and government  7.1 Civic virtue  7.2 Acoountability  8. Checks, balances, and freedom  8.1 Freedom  8.2 Policy stability  9. Acquiring and using knowledge  9.1 Information  9.2 Policy experimentation  10. Ethnic conflict and secession  10.1 Satisfying limited demands for autonomy  10.2 Splitting the prizes of politics  10.3 Restraining the central government  10.4 Socializing politicians  10.5 Stimulating growth of small ethnic parties  10.6 Conclusion  11. Data to the rescue?  11.1 The quality of government  11.2 Economic performance  11.3 Ethnic conflict  11.4 Democracy  11.5 Stable policies  12. Conclusion: Rethinking decentralization  12.1 Possible objections  12.2 Explaining decentralization's appeal  12.3 A new agenda? 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>9780521693820 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Descentralização Política<br/>Eficiência<br/>Política Fiscal<br/>Prestação de Contas<br/>Etnia<br/>Conflito<br/>Democracia