Gibbons, Robert <br/><br/>
Game theory for applied economists / 
por Robert Gibboons. -- 
 - Nova Jersey, EUA :  Princetn University Press,  1992. 
 - 267 p. :   il. 
<br/><br/>Inclui bibliografia. Inclui índice. 
<br/><br/> 1 Static Games of Complete Information  1.1 Basic Theory: normal-form games and Nash equilibrium  1.2 Applications  1.3 Advance theory: mixed strategies and existence of equilibrium  1.4 Futher reading  1.5 Problms  1.6 References  2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information  2.1 Dynamic games of complete and perfect information  2.2 Two-Stage games of complete but imperfect information  2.3 Repeated Games  2.4 Dynamic games of complete but imperfect information  2.5 Futher Reading  2.6 Problems  2.7 References  3 Static Games of Incomplete Information  3.1 Theory: static baysian games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium  3.2 Applications  3.3 The revelation principle  3.4 Futher reading  3.5 Problems  3.6 References  4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information  4.1 Introduction to perfect Bayesian Equilibrium  4.2 Signaling games  4.3 Other application of perfect Bayesian equilibrium  4.4 Refinements of perfect Bayesian equilibrium  4.5 Futher reading  4.6 Problems  4.7 References 
<br/><br/><br/>Texto completo em inglês. 
<br/><br/><label>ISBN: </label>0691043086 0691003955 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Teoria dos Jogos<br/>Economia