Formal models of domestic politics /
por Scott Gehlbach. --
- 2. ed.
- Nova York, EUA : Cambridge University Press, 2021.
- 269 p.
Acknowledgments Preface 1. Electoral Competition under Certainty 1.1 The Hotelling-Downs Model 1.2 The Wittman Model 1.3 Multiparty Competition 1.4 Entry Exercises 2. Electoral Competitions under Uncertainty 2.1 Multidimensional Policy Conflict 2.2 Divergence 2.3 Valence and Issue Ownership 2.4 Multiparty Competition 2.5 Entry 2.6 The Calculus of Voting Exercises 3. Special Interest Politics 3.1 A Model of Pure Campaign Finance 3.2 Campaign Finance and Policy Choice 3.3 Informative Campaign Finance 3.4 Bargaining over Policy 3.5 Menu Auctions Exercises 4. Veto Players 4.1 Policy Stability 4.2 Agenda Setting 4.3 Pivots 4.4 Dynamic Veto Bargaining 4.5 Portfolio Allocation 4.6 Veto Players and Special Interests Exercises 5. Delegation 5.1 Baseline Model 5.2 Discretion Limits 5.3 Legislative Capacity 5.4 Bureaucratic Capacity 5.5 Administrative Procedures 5.6 Lesgislative Override 5.7 Delegation to Committees and Legislative Procedure 5.8 Delegation to Leaders Exercises 6. Coalitions 6.1 Legislative Bargaining 6.2 Cohension 6.3 Government Formation 6.4 Endogenos Supermajorities Exercises 7. Political Agency 7.1 The Barro-Ferejohn Model 7.2 Career Concerns 7.3 Signaling Models of Political Agency 7.4 Voter Competence 8. Nondemocracy 8.1 Politics Without Institutions 8.2 Institutions and Political Survival 8.3 Institutions as Commitment Mechanisms 8.4 Bayesian Persuasion 8.5 Media Control and Electoral Manipulation 8.6 Informational Autocracy Exercises 9. Regime Change 9.1 Collective Action under Complete Information 9.2 Collective Action under Incomplete Information 9.3 Markov Games 9.4 Political Transitions Exercises References Author Index Subject Index