Private Governments in Urban Areas : political contracting and collective action
By: BAER, Susan E.; FEIOCK, Richard C.
Material type: ArticlePublisher: Thousand Oaks : Sage Publications, March 2005Subject(s): Transaction Resource Theory; Collective Action; Private GovernmentAmerican Review of Public Administration 35, 1, p. 42-56Abstract: Urban areas are increasingly populated by new organizations scalled private governments that are created within the boundaries of existing local governments. Examples include homeowner associations, community benefits districts, and business improvement districts. Citizens attempting to from private governments that supply public goods may encounter collective action problems. Utilizing transaction resource theory, the article examines potencial collective action problems in forming private governments and explains how solutions to these problems emerge as a consequence of a political contracting process between stakeholdes, where the rules of the resulting relational contract define expected cooperative behaviors. The article also applies transation resource theory to a case study of the contracting process used to overcome potential collective action problems in creating a private government in Baltimore, Maryland. The case study demonstrates the complexities of the contracting process and ilustrates how collective action problems migth be interwined in the prephase, negotiation phase, and postphase.Urban areas are increasingly populated by new organizations scalled private governments that are created within the boundaries of existing local governments. Examples include homeowner associations, community benefits districts, and business improvement districts. Citizens attempting to from private governments that supply public goods may encounter collective action problems. Utilizing transaction resource theory, the article examines potencial collective action problems in forming private governments and explains how solutions to these problems emerge as a consequence of a political contracting process between stakeholdes, where the rules of the resulting relational contract define expected cooperative behaviors. The article also applies transation resource theory to a case study of the contracting process used to overcome potential collective action problems in creating a private government in Baltimore, Maryland. The case study demonstrates the complexities of the contracting process and ilustrates how collective action problems migth be interwined in the prephase, negotiation phase, and postphase.
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