Les conséquences du fédéralisme sur l'élaboration de la politique de la Réserve fédérale
By: WOOLLEY, John T
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ArticlePublisher: Paris : IIAP, oct./déc. 1999Revue Française D'Administration Publique 92, p. 671-680Abstract: The Federal Reserve has a regional composition formed by twelve district banks and a central council, the council of governors. Several institutional characteristics contribute to the independence of the Federal Reserve, however the four-year mandate of the president of the Reserve expires, quite by chance, at the beginning of the year of the presidential election, something which is not without consequence for the relations between the Reserve and those in political power. The Federal Open Market Committee, the principal decision-making body of the Reserve, is made up notably of the presidents of the district banks, often accused of carrying out a strict form of monetary policy. An analysis of the reports of meetings over a limited period allows for a clarification of this judgement
The Federal Reserve has a regional composition formed by twelve district banks and a central council, the council of governors. Several institutional characteristics contribute to the independence of the Federal Reserve, however the four-year mandate of the president of the Reserve expires, quite by chance, at the beginning of the year of the presidential election, something which is not without consequence for the relations between the Reserve and those in political power. The Federal Open Market Committee, the principal decision-making body of the Reserve, is made up notably of the presidents of the district banks, often accused of carrying out a strict form of monetary policy. An analysis of the reports of meetings over a limited period allows for a clarification of this judgement
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