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Cooperação, liderança e impasse entre o legislativo e o executivo na produção legislativa do congresso nacional do Brasil

By: Gomes, Fábio de Barros Correia.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Rio de Janeiro : IESP / UERJ, 2012Online resources: Acesso Dados - Revista de Ciências Sociais 55, 4, p. 911-950Abstract: Cooperation, Leadership, and Impasse between the Legislative and Executive Branches in Lawmaking by the Brazilian National Congress This article discusses the relationship between Brazil’s Legislative and Executive Branches in lawmaking. It identifies elements in the lawmaking system in Brazil and strategic interactions between hierarchical channels (Constitutional, complementary, and ordinary legislation) in the context of coalition Presidentialism. The model was applied to bills submitted between 1999 and 2006 and generated data that run counter to the widespread perception of a sharp divide between the respective agendas of the two branches and the hypothesis of absolute predominance by the Executive. However, the prevailing government coalition predominated in all the lawmaking channels. Various types of interaction between the branches were suggested, according to patterns of conflict and leadership by the players (leadership, cooperation, and impasse), as generated by the bills’ contents.
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Cooperation, Leadership, and Impasse between the Legislative and Executive Branches in Lawmaking by the Brazilian National Congress This article discusses the relationship between Brazil’s Legislative and Executive Branches in lawmaking. It identifies elements in the lawmaking system in Brazil and strategic interactions between hierarchical channels (Constitutional, complementary, and ordinary legislation) in the context of coalition Presidentialism. The model was applied to bills submitted between 1999 and 2006 and generated data that run counter to the widespread perception of a sharp divide between the respective agendas of the two branches and the hypothesis of absolute predominance by the Executive. However, the prevailing government coalition predominated in all the lawmaking channels. Various types of interaction between the branches were suggested, according to patterns of conflict and leadership by the players (leadership, cooperation, and impasse), as generated by the bills’ contents.

ISSN 00115258 Versão Impressa

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