Distributive and partisan issues in agriculture policy in the 104th house
By: HURWITZ, Mark S
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Contributor(s): MOILES, Roger J | ROHDE, David W.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2001American Political Science Review 95, 4, p. 911-22Abstract: Distributive, informational, and partisan rationales provide contrasting accounts of legislative politcs. Which of these theorie best explains the decisions and policies of the Hose Agriculture Committee? We contend that all are appropriate, at various times, depending upon the particular issues and circumstances. By analysing issues within the jurisdirection of the Agriculture Commitee and the Agriculture and Rural Development Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee in the 104th House, we demonstrate that the issue environements of both are multidemensional (even within individual bills) and that each committee has both distributive and partisan policy dimension. Therefore, it is impossible for either committee to be representative of the chamber on all its policy dimensions simultaneously. In addition, with regard to distributive issues salient to members, we find that both commitiees are homogeneous, high-demand outliers. Our study has important implications for distributive, informational, and partisan theories of legislative behavior and organization
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
Distributive, informational, and partisan rationales provide contrasting accounts of legislative politcs. Which of these theorie best explains the decisions and policies of the Hose Agriculture Committee? We contend that all are appropriate, at various times, depending upon the particular issues and circumstances. By analysing issues within the jurisdirection of the Agriculture Commitee and the Agriculture and Rural Development Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee in the 104th House, we demonstrate that the issue environements of both are multidemensional (even within individual bills) and that each committee has both distributive and partisan policy dimension. Therefore, it is impossible for either committee to be representative of the chamber on all its policy dimensions simultaneously. In addition, with regard to distributive issues salient to members, we find that both commitiees are homogeneous, high-demand outliers. Our study has important implications for distributive, informational, and partisan theories of legislative behavior and organization
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