Part I. The need for and forms of cooperation Economic theories of the state - Russel Hardin Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in collective action arenas - Elinor Ostrom and James Walker The political economy of federalism - Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld The public choice of international organizations - Bruno S. Frey Constitutional public choice - Dennis C. Mueller Part II. Voting rules and preference aggregation Cycling and majority rule - James M. Enelow Majority rule - Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler Group choice and individual judgments - H. Peyton Young Some paradoxes of preference aggregation - Prasanta K. Pattanaik Voting and the revelation of preferences for public activities - T. Nicolaus Tideman Part III. Electoral politics The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four decades of research - Peter C. Ordeshook Multiparty electoral politics - Norman Schofield Interest groups: money, information, and influence - David Austen-Smith Logrolling - Thomas Stratmann Political business cycles - Martin Paldam Part IV. Individual behavior and collective action When is it rational to vote? - John H. Aldrich Voting behavior. Morris P. Fiorina Public choice experiments - Elizabeth Hoffman Part V. Public choice in action Modern bureaucratic theory -Ronald Wintrobe The positive theory of public bureaucracy - Terry M. Moe The political economy of taxation - Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer Rent seeking - Robert D. Tollison Endogenous protection: the empirical evidence - Stephen P. Magge Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of the recent literature on the U.S experience - Cheryl M. Holsey and Thomas E. Borcherding