000			01741naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10312
003			OSt
005			20190211155008.0
008			030121s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGRANTHAM, Andrew _94297
245	1	0	_aHow networks explain unintended policy implementation outcomes : _bthe case of UK rail privatization
260			_c2001
520	3		_aHow a government secures the implementation of is policies is one of the most interesting processes in public administration. The tendency o scholars is to ignore implementation and how it impacts on the form of policy, something which invariable changes once resources have been allocated to implementing agencies and the policy detail is addressed. Traditional `top-down`(Pressman and Wildavsky 1984/ Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981) analytical frameworks give only a partial explanation of outcomes. In making the case for a network approach, a typology of implementation networks is presented. The utility of this typology is evaluated in the context of one of the most complex privatization programmes attemped by any government: the privatization of British Rail (BR) between 1992 and 1997. In the cse of the sale of one BR subsidiary train operating company, ScotRail, a variety of agencies with competing interests and acting in a politically-charged climate exchanged essential resources to deliver the policy, though not without generating uninteded outcomes in the form of significant change to teh policy and the agencies chaged with implementing it
773	0	8	_tPublic Administration an International Quarterly _g79, 4, p. 851-870 _d, 2001 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030121 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060609 _b1200^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10438 _d10438
041			_aeng