000			01518naa a2200193uu 4500
001			10346
003			OSt
005			20190211155016.0
008			030122s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aDAHLBERG, Matz _92659
245	1	0	_aOn the vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments
260			_cmar.2002
520	3		_aIn this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purshasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision-making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-weibul/Dixit - Longregan model, in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. this result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do not, however, find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters
700	1		_aJOHANSSON, Eva _919468
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g96, 1, p. 27-40 _d, mar.2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030122 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060609 _b1531^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10472 _d10472
041			_aeng