000			01543naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10449
003			OSt
005			20190211155041.0
008			030123s1999 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aOCASIO, William _97852
245	1	0	_aInstitutionalized action and corporate governance : _bthe reliance on rules of CEO succession
260			_aIthaca : _bJohnson Graduate School of Management, _cJune 1999
520	3		_aThis paper follows an instituional theory of action in exploring the consequences of formal and informal rules on the chief executive officer (CEO) succession process. An analysis of the competing risks of insider versus outsider CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations provides evidence that boards rely on both past precedents and formal internal labor markets for executive succession and the selection of insiders versus outsiders as CEOs. To exclude alternative explanations that view rules as epiphenomenal, I examine the moderating efffects of performance, late CEO departures, the founder`s power, and board structure on reliance on rules. The results show substantial inertia in the rules of CEO succession, consistent with an institutionalized action perspective. the findings sugggest that rules both enable and constrain board decision making
773	0	8	_tAdministrative Science Quarterly _g44, 2, p. 384-416 _dIthaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, June 1999 _xISSN 00018392 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030123 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20101027 _b1630^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10575 _d10575
041			_aeng