000			01826naa a2200205uu 4500
001			10454
003			OSt
005			20190211155043.0
008			030123s1999 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aPORAC, Joseph F _98553
245	1	0	_aIndustry categories and the politics of the comparable firm in CEO compensation
260			_aIthaca : _bJohnson Graduate School of Management, _cMarch 1999
520	3		_aWe examine the blending of inforamtiona and political forces in organization categorizations in the context of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. By law, corporate boards are required to provide shareholders with annual justifications for their CEO pay allocations that contain an explicit performance comparison with a set of peer companies that are selected by the board. We collected and and analyzed information on the industry membership of chosen peers from a 1993 sample of 280 members of the Standard and Poor`s (S&P) 500 Our results suggest that boards anchor their comparability judgements within a firm`s primary industry, thus supporting the argument that board`s peer definitions center around commonsense industry categories. At the same time, however, we found that boards selectively define peers in self-protective ways, such that peer definitions are expanded beyond industry boundaries when firms performa poorly, industries perform well, CEOs are paid perform poorly, industries perform well, CEOs are paid highly, and when shareholders are powerful and active
700	1		_aWADE, James B _919532
700	1		_aPOLLOCK, Timothy G _919533
773	0	8	_tAdministrative Science Quarterly _g44, 1, p. 112-144 _dIthaca : Johnson Graduate School of Management, March 1999 _xISSN 00018392 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030123 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20101027 _b1628^b _cCarolina
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10580 _d10580
041			_aeng