000			01256naa a2200193uu 4500
001			10601
003			OSt
005			20190211155115.0
008			030130s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aERIKSON, Robert S _93274
245	1	0	_aEquilibria in campaign spending games : _btheory and data
260			_c2000
520	3		_aWe present a formal game-theoretic model to explain the simultaneity problem that makes it difficult to obaint unbiased estimates of the effects of both incumbent and challenge spending in U.S. House elections. The model predicts a particular form of correlation between the expected closeness of the race and the level of spending by both candidates, which implies that the simultaneity problem should not be present in close races and should be progessively more severe in the range of safe races that are empiracally observed. This is confirmed by comparing simple OLS regression of races that are expected to be close with races that are not, using House incumbent races spanning two decades
700	1		_aPALFREY, Thomas R _919612
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 3, p. 595-610 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030130 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060721 _b1634^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10727 _d10727
041			_aeng