000			01238naa a2200193uu 4500
001			10638
003			OSt
005			20190211155117.0
008			030131s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGROSECLOSE, Tim _94372
245	1	0	_aVote buying supermajorities, and flooded coalitions
260			_c2000
520	3		_aIn a recent paper, Banks (2000), adopting the framework of our model (Groseclose and Snyder 1996), derives several new and noteworthy results. In addition, he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4. Here we explain the error in our porposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assuption:in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition, that is, she does not bribe every member of her coalition. We conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of Bank`s proposition 1; we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote-buying game
700	1		_aSNYDER, James _919627
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 3, p. 683-684 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030131 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060724 _b1106^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10764 _d10764
041			_aeng