000			01586naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10642
003			OSt
005			20190211155118.0
008			030131s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aTREISMAN, Daniel _910778
245	1	0	_aDecentralization and inflation : _bcommitment, collective action, or continuity?
260			_c2000
520	3		_aDo political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation? Statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relatioship between decentralization and the level of inflation. Political decentralization, however, does appear to reduce change in countries` relative inflation rates over time. By creating additional veto players, federal structure may "lock in" existing patterns of monetary policy - whether inflationary or strict. Among the (mostly developed) countries that started with low inflation, inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states. Among the (mostly developing) countries that started with high infaltio, infaltion tended to increase faster in the federations. There is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country`s degree of practical central bank independence - whether high or low - and the relative hardness of softness of budege constraints on subnational governments
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 4, p. 837-858 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030131 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060724 _b1613^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10768 _d10768
041			_aeng