000			01524naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10649
003			OSt
005			20190211155119.0
008			030131s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSCHICKLER, Eric _99636
245	1	0	_aInstitutional change in the house of representatives, 1867-1998 : _ba test of partisan and ideological power balance models
260			_c2000
520	3		_aI examine competing explanations for House rules changes with significant partisan overtones. I sought to identify all rules changes adopted from 1867 to 1998 that were intended either to advantage or to undermine the majority party and its leaders in their efforts to shape the House agenda. I test a majority party cartel model of institutional change against a model taht focuses on the ideologica balance of power on the floor, that is, on the closeness of the median voeter to the median memeber of the majority and minirty parties. I also evaluate the conditional party government approach. The data analysis suggests the preeminent importance of shifts in the ideological balance. Two variabels identified by the conditional party government theory, party polarization and party capacity , obtain limited support but their eefect is neither as robust nor as large in magnitude as that of change in the median voter`s position
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 2, p. 269-288 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030131 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060724 _b1619^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10775 _d10775
041			_aeng