000			01740naa a2200193uu 4500
001			10653
003			OSt
005			20190211155120.0
008			030131s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCLARK, William Roberts _92239
245	1	0	_aMobile capital , domestic institutions, and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy
260			_c2000
520	3		_aThe literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymarkers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetray expansions occur only when the eschenge rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe
700	1		_aHALLERBERG, Mark _917179
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 2, p. 323-346 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030131 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060724 _b1621^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10779 _d10779
041			_aeng