000			01419naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10687
003			OSt
005			20190211155130.0
008			030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aAPPERLEY, Alan _9440
245	1	0	_aLiberalism, autonomy and stability
260			_capr.2002
520	3		_aSupporters of liberal neutrality distinguish between `weak' conceptions of autonomy which operate as background features of liberal democractic regimes, and `strong' conceptions, which amout to conceptions opf the good. These latter are to be excluded from the political realm on the grounds that in order to protect and promote a conception of the good, in the context of a pluralistic society, the state would have to resort to illiberal methods. The result of this will be the destablization and fragmentation of the regime. In this article I argue two things: first, that autonomy ought to be understood, not as a neutral background assumption of liberal theory, but as a partially comprehensive conception of the good in its own right; secondly, that protecting and promoting autonomy need not lead either to illiberalism or to the destabilization and fragmentation of liberal democratic society
773	0	8	_tBritish Journal of Political Science _g30, part 2, p. 291-311 _d, apr.2002 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030203 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060726 _b0948^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10813 _d10813
041			_aeng