000			01096naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10706
003			OSt
005			20190211155135.0
008			030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGERARDI, Dino _94020
245	1	0	_aJury verdicts and preference diversity
260			_c2000
520	3		_aI develop a model of decision making in juries when there is uncertainty about juror`s preferencs. I provide a characterization of the equilibrium strategy under any voting rule and show that nonunanimous rules are asymptotically efficient. Specifically, large juries make the correct decision with probability close to one. My analysis also demonstrates that under the unanimous rule, large juries almost never convict the defendant. The last result contrasts markedly with the literature and suggests that be unanimity rule can protect the innocent only at the rice of acquitting the guilty
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 2, p. 395-406 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030203 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060726 _b1032^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10832 _d10832
041			_aeng