000			01586naa a2200205uu 4500
001			10707
003			OSt
005			20190211155135.0
008			030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aGUARNASCHELLI, Serena _94396
245	1	0	_aAn experimental sutyd of jury decison rules
260			_c2000
520	3		_aWe present experimental results on groups facing a dicision problem analogous to that faced by a jury. We consider three treatement variables: group size (three or six), number of votes needed for conviction (majority or unanimity), and pre-vot deliberation. We find evidence of strategic voting under unanimity rule: a large farction of our subjects vote for decision analogous to conviction even when their private information indicates a state analogous to innocence. This is roughly consistent with the game theoretic predictions of Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Although individual behavior is explained well by ghe game theoretic model, there are discrepancies at the level of the group decision. Contraty to Feddersen and Pesendorfer, nour experiments there are fewer outcomes analogous to incorrect convictions under unanimity rule than under majority rule. In the case of no deliberation, we simultaneously accont for the individual and group data using quantial response equilibrium
700	1		_aMcKELVEY, Richard D _919695
700	1		_aPALFREY, Thomas r _919696
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 2, p. 407-424 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030203 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20051124 _b1445^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10833 _d10833
041			_aeng