| 000 | 01005naa a2200181uu 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 10708 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20190211155135.0 | ||
| 008 | 030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_aMOLINARI, M. Christina _97331 |
|
| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aMilitary capabilities and escalation : _ba correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick |
| 260 | _c2000 | ||
| 520 | 3 | _aBueno de Mesquita , Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 |
_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 2, p. 425-428 _d, 2000 _w |
| 942 | _cS | ||
| 998 |
_a20030203 _bCassio _cCassio |
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| 998 |
_a20060726 _b1035^b _cQuiteria |
||
| 999 |
_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10834 _d10834 |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||