000			01561naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10713
003			OSt
005			20190211155137.0
008			030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
245	1	0	_aSenate representation and coalition building in distributive politics
260			_c2000
520	3		_aThe Senate`s equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics. The great variation in state population means that some states have for greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weith. As a result, even though all senators` votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal "price". Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to proram budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states. Building on format models of coalition building two hypotheses are developed and tested. First, coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently. Second, the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small-state senators than large-state senators. The hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997-98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs. The findings support both hypotheses
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 1, p. 59-72 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030203 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060726 _b1045^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10839 _d10839
710			_aLEE, Frances E
041			_aeng