000			01545naa a2200205uu 4500
001			10716
003			OSt
005			20190211155137.0
008			030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aCAMERAON, Charles _91729
245	1	0	_aStrategic auditing in a political hierarchy : _ban informational model of the supreme Court`s certiorari decisions
260			_c2000
520	3		_aWe examine how the Supreme Court uses signals and indices from lower courts to determine which cases to review. In our game theoretic model, a higher court cues from publicly observable case facts, the known preferences of a lower court and its decision. The lower court attempts to enforce its own preferences, exploiting ambiguity in cases` fact patterns. In equilibrium, a conservative higher court declines to review conservative decisions from lower courts regardless of the facts of the case of the relative ideology of the judges . But a conservative higher court probabilistically reviews liberal decisions, with the "audit rate" tied to observable facts and the ideology of the lower court judge. We derive comparative static results and rest them with a random sample of search-and-seizure cases appealed to the Burger Court between 1972 and 1986. The evidence broadly supports the model
700	1		_aSEGAL, Jeffrey A _99752
700	1		_aSONGER, Donald _919703
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 1, p. 101-116 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030203 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060726 _b1047^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10842 _d10842
041			_aeng