000			01470naa a2200181uu 4500
001			10717
003			OSt
005			20230314161631.0
008			030203s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_96900 _aMcCarty, Nolan
245	1	0	_aPresidential pork : _bexecutive veto power and distributive politics
260			_c2000
520	3		_aIt is often argue that executive powers such as the veto serve to reduce particularistic spending by the legislature. I argue that the effect of the executive veto depends strongly on assumptions about both the nature of executive preferences and the institutional structure of executive-legislative bargaining. To support these claims I develop a model of distributive policymaking subject to an executive veto. This framework incorporates variation in presidential objectives and formal powers into a dynamic bargaining model. In equilibrium , stronger veto power leads to a lower level of distributive spending, but the effects are mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others. The model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers, including the effects of divided government, electoral rules, and term limitations for the executive
773	0	8	_tAmerican Political Science Review _g94, 1, p. 117-130 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030203 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060726 _b1048^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c10843 _d10843
041			_aeng