000			01494naa a2200205uu 4500
001			11309
003			OSt
005			20190211155405.0
008			030219s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aBERENDS, T.C _91046
245	1	0	_aCost plus incentive fee contracting - experiences and structuring
260			_cjun.2000
520	3		_aIn this paper the contractual relationship between owner and /Engineering contractor during the development and implementation of capital investment project is considered. The described Cost Plus Incentive Fee contract type provides a mechanism for allocating project cost risk to the owner, being the party best placed to bear the cost risk consequences and providing a performance incentive for the Engineering Contractor, being the party best placed to bear the cost risk consequences and providing a performance incentive for the Engineering Contractor, being the party best place to manage the cost risk. The results of an analysis of eight case studies case studies involving major capital investment projects from the oil and chemicals industry are presented and a quantitative methodology for structuring incentives shemes is described and illustrated
650		4	_aContracting Cost Plus Contracts _920160
650		4	_aIncentives Contracts _920161
773	0	8	_tInternational Journal of Project Management _g18, 3, p. 165-171 _d, jun.2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030219 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060802 _b0858^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c11433 _d11433
041			_aeng