000			02004naa a2200181uu 4500
001			11545
003			OSt
005			20190211155514.0
008			030226s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aMILLER, Gary _97230
245	1	0	_aAbove politics : _bcredible commitment and efficiency in the design of public agencies
260			_capr. 2000
520	3		_aThe state has, since its origins, been characterized both by the production of public goods and a competition for the surplus benefits generated by the creation of those goods. Holmstrom's (1982) analysis of an impossibility result leads to the conclusion that this problem is logically inescapable. There is no process for exactly allocating of an interdependent social process that eliminates moral hazard. Furthermore, morally hazardous behavior can undermine the efficiency of the processes that generate the benefits. In both firms and states, therefore, the credible constraint of morally hazardous behavior is a fundamental concern. In both forms of social organization, delegation to bureaucracy can enhance efficiency by creating barriers between those actors with moral hazard and the producers of the benefits. The characteristics of Weberian bureaucracy, including rational/legal constraints and autonomous professional norms, serve to insulate bureaucrats frin efficiency-undermining political pressures. This perspective provides support for concerns of the century-old Progressive reform tradition, which wanted to place bureaucratics "above politics" - and stands in contrast to the more recent principal/agency perspective, which argues that the fundamental problems its the creation of incentive systems that make bureaucratic subordinates increasingly responsive to the preferences of political superiors
773	0	8	_tJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory _g10, 2, p. 289-327 _d, apr. 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030226 _bLucima _cLucimara
998			_a20060210 _b1541^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c11668 _d11668
041			_aeng