000			01762naa a2200181uu 4500
001			11742
003			OSt
005			20190211155624.0
008			030312s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aSHORT, Pamela Farley _99896
245	1	0	_aHitting a moving target income-related health insurance subsidies for the uninsured
260			_c2000
520	3		_aNew government health insurance programs are likely to emphasize voluntary purchases in a market setting, with subsidies targeted at low-income populations and stress on managed care. Such programs are best structured with a guaranteed enrollment period that is as long as six months to a year. However, given that incomes change over time, erros will be made in awarding income-related subsidies for that long. These erros are assessed in simulations undertaken with longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Two allocations of the subsidies, based on current income at the beginning of the enrollment period and on actual income assessed at the end, are compared for a variety of program designs. Prospective determination of subsidies is somewhat biased toward overpayment. Net overpayments amoun to 5-10 percent of subsidy costs. However, prospective payment encourages participation in the sudsidy program. The simulated particpation rate for true eligibles is as high as 73 percent with prospective subsidies, compared to 69 percent with retrospective reconciliation. Net overpayments are slightly reduced by testing income less frequently and over longer periods
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g19, 3, p. 383-405 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030312 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060331 _b1551^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c11865 _d11865
041			_aeng