000			01686naa a2200181uu 4500
001			11744
003			OSt
005			20190211155624.0
008			030312s2006 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
100	1		_aLANGBEIN, Laura I _95861
245	1	0	_aOwnership, empowerment, and productivity : _bsome empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of employee discretion
260			_c2000
520	3		_aThis paper uses a sample of professional engineers employes in the public and private sector to investigate the effect of sector employment, indicators of task complexity, organization size, number of rules, importance, and attentiveness and agreement among various principals (custumers or clients, peers, mid- and top-level management, and politicians) on both employee discretion and a subjective measure of employee productivity. The results show that disagreement among important and attentive proximate principals (mid-level managers) expands discretion, but disagreement among important and attentive distant principals (top executives and politicians) reduces discretion. Sector has no direct or indirect effect on discretion. When customers or clients and peers are imporrtant and attentive principals, discretion increases, and so does productivity. Monitoring by mid-level management has no effect on productivity. Because disagreement among distant principals is greater in the public sector, devolution of authority alone is unlikely to increase public sector productivity
773	0	8	_tJournal of Policy Analysis and Management _g19, 3, p. 427-449 _d, 2000 _w
942			_cS
998			_a20030312 _bCassio _cCassio
998			_a20060331 _b1630^b _cQuiteria
999			_aConvertido do Formato PHL _bPHL2MARC21 1.1 _c11867 _d11867
041			_aeng